The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a model game. The dynamics of the model game differs from the original one. The general result applied to differential games yields the approximation of value function of differential game by the solution of countable system of ODEs.
Introduction
Continuous-time dynamical games can be classified as differential games, stochastic differential games and Markov games (or continuous-time stochastic games). For each type the existence theorem for the value function is proved (see [2] , [9] , [12] , [25] , [30] for differential games case, [5] , [8] , [16] , [27] for stochastic games case and [15] , [32] for continuous-time Markov games case). Moreover, it is shown that the value function solves the Isaacs-Bellman equation (see [10] , [28] for differential games case, [4] , [5] , [27] for stochastic games case and [32] for continuous-time Markov games case). The aim of this paper is to provide an approximation of a solution of a continuous-time dynamical game by a solution of a game with a different dynamics.
First this problem was considered for particular cases in [1] , [19] - [23] . In [20] - [23] the approximation of the value function of differential game by the value function of stochastic differential game was constructed. In [19] (see also [1] ) the continuous-time Markov game describing the system of interacting particles with the finite number of states is considered by examining the differential game corresponding to the limit case when the number of particles tends to infinity. It is proved that if the strategy is optimal for the limit game then it is near optimal for the Markov game.
In this paper we consider the following problem: given two stochastic games controlled by Markov processes associated with generators of Lévy-Khintchine type, construct the strategy in the first game approximating the value function of the second game. To this end we use the extremal shift first proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin for differential games [25] (see also [29] ). In this case the design of strategy relies on a model of the system. In the early works by Krasovskii and Subbotin the model was a copy of the original system [25] , [24] . Later it was considered the case when the original system is governed by a delay differential equation and the model is governed by a differential equation [22] , [26] and the case when the original system is governed by a differential equation whereas the model is described by a stochastic differential equation [20] - [23] . In [1] the extremal shift is constructed for the case when the original system is the Markov chain describing many particle interacting system and the model is governed by a differential equation.
We construct the extremal shift for the first game using the second game as a model. If the player uses this strategy, then her outcome is estimated by the value function of the second game, the rate of the proximity of the original and model systems and the rate of the randomness of the dynamics of both games. Thus, the result is primary applicable for the case when either the original system or the model is deterministic. We apply it for the case when the first game is a differential game when the second game is a continuous-time Markov game. This yields the approximation of the value function of the differential game by the solution of the system of countably many ODEs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the examining class of games, define strategies with memory and introduce the assumptions. In Section 3 we define the extremal shift for a continuous-time stochastic game controlled by a Markov process associated with a generator of Lévy-Khintchine type and formulate the main result of the paper concerning upper and lower bounds of the value function. In Section 4 we prove the main result. In Section 5 we recall the main notions of the theory of differential games. Moreover we derive the near optimal strategies for the differential game based on solution of the parabolic equation. Note that first this construction was proposed by Krasovskii and Kotelnikova for pursuit-evasion games [20] - [23] . In the last section we present the approximation of the value of the differential game by the solution of the system of countably many ODEs.
Definitions and assumptions
Here B 1 denotes the unit ball centered at the origin,
The parameters u and v are considered as controls of the first and second players respectively. The classes of admissible strategies of the first and second players are described below. Note that under some conditions the operator L 1 t [u, v] generates a stochastic process X(·).
The first (respectively second) player wishes to minimize (respectively, maximize) Eg(X(T )). In the paper we approximate the value of this game using a solution of a stochastic game with a dynamics governed by a Markov process associated with a generator of Lèvy-Khintchine type
In the general case, 
) satisfying the following conditions
,T ] -progressive measurable stochastic process with values in U, whereas P U x(·) is a probability on
Note that the presented definition of strategy includes feedback strategies, and randomized feedback strategies.
A strategy of the second player is a 5- 
) be strategies of the first and the second players respectively.
A
is a realization of the motion generated by the strategies u, v and the initial position (t 0 , x 0 ) if the following conditions hold true.
4. X(t 0 ) = x 0 P -a.s.
The process
Here u and v are stochastic processes defined by the rules
6. For any x(·) ∈ D t 0 and any random variable
where E U x(·) denotes the expectation corresponding to the probability P U x(·) .
7. For any x(·) ∈ D t 0 and any random variable
where E V x(·) denotes the expectation corresponding to the probability P Given the strategies u, v, the outcome is not defined in the unique way. The values
, X(·), P ) realizing a motion generated by the strategies u and v and the initial position (t 0 , x 0 )},
, X(·), P ) realizing a motion generated by the strategies u and v and the initial position (t 0 , x 0 )} are the upper and lower outcomes according to the strategies u and v. The upper value of the game is
The lower value is equal to
Below we estimate this values using strategies based on the model of the game.
Extremal shift for continuous-time Markov games
If A is a metric space then denote by rpm(A) the set of Radon probabilities on A. If A is a compact then the rpm(A) is also a compact [31] . Below if µ is a function with values in rpm(A), t ∈ [0, T ], B ⊂ A we write µ(t, B) instead of µ(t)(B). If the function µ takes values in rpm(U) (respectively, in rpm(V )) then it is called generalized control of the first (respectively, second) player. 
3. for any random variable φ on Ω t,θ dependence of E t,θ ξ,v φ on ξ and v is measurable;
Here E t,θ ξ,v denotes the expectation corresponding to the probability P
The proposed definition of u-stability generalizes the definition given by Krasovskii and Subbotion for differential games. This is proved in Proposition 2 below. Theorem 1 provides the estimate of the function Val + (t 0 , x 0 ) by the u-stable function c + .
To estimate the function Val − (t 0 , x 0 ) we will use v-stable functions.
ξ,u with values in R d , and a probability P
3. for any random variable φ on Ω t,θ dependence of E t,θ ξ,u φ on ξ and u is measurable;
Here E t,θ ξ,u denotes the expectation corresponding to the probability P t,θ ξ,u . Given a u-stable function c + and a partition ∆ = {t l } r l=0 of the interval
) by the rules (5), (6) (see below). To this end we need some additional notion.
If condition (L8)- (1) is fulfilled then put
can be chosen to be measurable.
To define the strategyû ∆ we construct a sequence of models of the game.
) is called a model of the game for the partition ∆ and the number l if the following conditions hold true:
. , x(t j ) where t j is the greatest element of ∆ such that t j ≤ τ ;
, where E l x(·) denotes the expectation corresponding to the probability P l x(·) . Proposition 1. Assume that c + is u-stable with respect to generator t l . Additionally, let ∆ = {t l } r l=0 be a partition of [t 0 , T ]. Then for any l = 1, . . . , r there exists a model for the partition ∆ and the number l.
Proof. We construct the models inductively.
First, put Γ
is a model at t 1 . Now assume that the model is constructed for the number l. Define the model for l + 1 in the following way. Put Γ
By construction the 7-tuple (
) that is the model of the game for the partition ∆ and the number r. The strategŷ
Below we use the following designations:
where constants M 
In formula (9) i = 1 if (L8)- (1) is fulfilled and i = 2 in the opposite case,
Recall that the payoff function g is Lipschitz continuous with constant R.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the next section. Corollary 1 directly follows from Theorem 1. To prove the Corollary 2 it suffices to consider the game with payoff function given by −g and interchange the players.
Properties of the model of the game
, X(·), P ) be a realization of the motion for the strategy of the first playerû ∆ and some strategy of the second player v, partition ∆ = {t l } r l=1 and the initial position (t 0 , x 0 ). Recall (see Section 3) that the construction of the strategyû ∆ relies on model at time t r = T (see Definition 5) . Further, the elements of
) be the model of the game used in the definition of the strategyû ∆ (see (5) , (6)
Lemma 1. We have that
is a martingale;
The proof of the Lemma directly follows from (6)- (13), the properties of the model of the game for the number r and the construction the strategyû ∆ .
Lemma 2.
There exist a function α 2 (·) ∈ A such that for t ≥ s
Proof. Since (2) is a martingale, taking into account (1) we have that
Using condition (L5) we obtain that
Gronwall's inequality yields the estimate
we get from (14) the following estimate
Finally, put
Lemma 3. There exist a function α 3 (·) ∈ A such that for t ≥ s
The proof of this Lemma is analogous to the proof of the previous Lemma and relies on Lemma 1 and conditions (L1)-(L7).

Lemma 4. There exists a function ǫ(·) ∈ A such that
Proof. We have that
Thus, by Lemmas 2 and 3
It follows from conditions (L4) and (L6) that for τ ∈ [t l , t l+1 ]
Thus, (17) and Lemma 2 yield the inequality
. (18) Here we denote α 4 (δ)
Note that α 4 (·) ∈ A. Analogously, using Lemma 3 we obtain that
Here α 5 (·) is a function from the set A given by the rule (18) , (19) and Lemmas 2, 3 we obtain that
Now assume that condition (L8)- (1) is fulfilled. Taking into account condition (L6) and definition of κ (see (7)) we obtain that for all w ∈ U
If condition (L8)- (2) holds true the inequality (21) takes the form
The statement 4 of Lemma 1 yields that for any τ ∈ [t l , t l+1 ), and any w ∈ U
This, (8), (20), the definition of β (see (9)) and inequalities (21), (22) imply inequality (15) .
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 4 we have
Therefore,
Taking into account statement 1 of Lemma 1 we obtain that
where the constant C is defined by (10). Jensen's inequality yields the estimate
We have that
Further, taking into account (23) we get the inequality
Statement 3 of Lemma 1 yields the inequality
Since Y (t 0 ) = X(t 0 ) P -a.s., we obtain that
Since ǫ(δ) → 0 as δ → 0, we get the conclusion of the Theorem.
Value function of differential game
In this section we consider differential game with the dynamics given by
This equation corresponds to the generator
As above the variable u (respectively, v) stands for the control of the first (respectively, second) player. The aim of first (respectively, second) player is to minimize (respectively, maximize) the payoff function g(x(T )). Let
) is a set of open-loop strategies of the first (respectively, second) player.
We assume that the function f 1 is continuous, bounded by M 1 1 , Lipschitz continuous with respect to x with the constant K 1 . Additionally, we suppose that the Isaacs condition is fulfilled, i.e. for any
We use the feedback formalization of differential games proposed by Krasovskii and Subbotin. Let p : [0, T ] × R d → U be a function, (t 0 , x 0 ) be an initial position, and let ∆ = {t l } r l=1 be a partition of the interval [t 0 , T ]. We say that the strategy
Note that the elements of the set U t 0 ,x 0 ,∆ are stepwise deterministic strategies. Ad-
is well-defined. Analogously, we say that the strategy
As above, for any (
is well-defined. Krasovskii and Subbotin proved that there exist functions p
Here B A stands for the set of functions from A to B. Note that the value function Val can be defined using nonanticipating strategies [2] . This formalization is equivalent to Krasovskii-Subbotin approach [28] .
The function c + :
the following inequality holds true
Recall [25] that if c + is Krasovskii-Subbotin u-stable then there exists a function
In addition, [28, Theorem 6.4] states that c + is Krasovskii-Subbotin u-stable function if and only if c + is a minimax (viscosity) supersolution of the Hamilton-Jacobi PDE
The link between Krasovskii-Subbotin u-stability and the notion of u-stability with respect to the generator introduced in Definition 3 is given in the following.
ξ,v is a deterministic process. Finally, let P t,θ ξ,v be an arbitrary probability on Ω t,θ . Formula (27) yields that the process (3) for L The notion of Krasovskii-Subbotin v-stability is defined in the same way as ustability. For v-stable functions an analog of Proposition 2 is also fulfilled. Now we consider the case when the model system is given by a stochastic differential equation.
then ψ σ is u-and v-stable with respect to
ξ,v be a Wiener measure on Ω t,θ . Further, for the constant second player's control v ∈ V consider the control problem for the stochastic differential equation
on time interval [t, θ] with the payoff functional given by E t,θ ξ,v ψ σ (θ, Y (θ)). By [17] there exist a control u t,θ ξ,v and a function ρ : 
To prove the u-stability of the function ψ σ with respect to L 2 t it suffices to put µ t,θ ξ,v δ u t,θ ξ,v where δ z denotes the Dirac measure concentrated at z.
The v-stability of ψ σ is proved in the same way.
Theorem 1, Corollaries 1, 2 and Propositions 2, 3 imply the following for
Corollary 3. Letû ∆ be a stepwise strategy constructed by (5) and (6) 
Remark 2. Corollary 4 provides the rate of convergence for the vanishing viscosity approximations of Hamilton-Jacobi PDE. This result corresponds to [6, Proposition 3.2].
Approximation of differential game by Markov games
Given a differential game with dynamics (24) define the Markov game in the following way.
Let h be a positive number,
and let e i denote the i-th coordinate vector. Put
Recall that δ z denotes the Dirac measure concentrated at z. Further, define
This generator corresponds to the continuous-time Markov chain on hZ d with the Kolmogorov matrix
The value function for the game with the generator L 2 defined by (30) provides the upper and lower bounds for the value function of the differential game.
The following system of ODEs is the Isaacs-Bellman equation for the Markov game.
where x ∈ hZ d is a parameter.
Proposition 4.
There exists an unique solution of (32).
Proof. We consider system (32) as a differential equation in the Banach space
First let us show that if η
Since 2(h + x ) ≥ 2h + x ≥ h + x + hχ i (t, x, u, v)) , we get the inequality
From Lipschitz continuity of the function g and Gronwall's inequality it follows that
Consider the boundary value problem
We have that the function H is continuous and Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. ̺. Indeed,
Hence, by [7, §1] 
Proof. First, let us show that η + h is an upper value of the Markov game with the Kolmogorov matrix defined by (31) . If u and v are strategies of the first and second players respectively then denote the upper outcome in the game with the generator L 2 given by (30) by I * (t 0 , x 0 , u, v).
) be a strategy of the first player. Consider the following counter-strategy of the second playerv
where
Note that the Markov chain generated by the pair of strategies u Combining (35) and (36) we obtain that η + h is an upper value function for the game with the generator defined by (30) . Now let us show that η + h is u-stable with respect to L 2 given by (30) . Let t, θ ∈ [0, T ], t < θ. We have that if the initial position of the Markov chain with Kolmogorov matrix (31) For a given v ∈ V , ξ ∈ hZ d , ω ∈ Ω t,θ put u t,θ ξ,v (τ, ω) u * (τ, ω(τ )).
Further, let P we obtain that the function η + h is u-stable with respect to the generator L 2 given by (30) .
Using (7) and (L5) we conclude that for the generators L 1 and L 2 given by (25) and (30) 1/2 C, where C is defined by (10) . Now we shall prove the following inequality
Consider the generators L Combining (37) and (38) we get inequality (34).
Proof. To prove this Corollary it suffices to interchange the players and replace the payoff function with −σ in Theorem 2.
